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lantic, till she suddenly vanishes from the surface of the sea after an unexplainable explosion within her. Then we note the gradual imprisoning of the Königsberg. Then we watch the unprecedented raids of Admiral von Spee, whose success ended with his victory over the too gallant Craddock in the ill-advised battle that Admiral Lord Fisher entered the Admiralty too late to prevent. Finally, we see the impulse of new life as Fisher re-enters the Admiralty, and the amazing trip on which he sends Admiral Sturdee in the Invincible and Inflexible, that culminated at the Falkland Islands in the sinking of von Spee's ships, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Nürnberg, and Leipzig, and the escaping of the Dresden.

Bradley A. Fiske.

Aus Meinem Leben. Von Generalfeldmarschall von HINDENBURG. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1920. Pp. xii, 409. \$3.75.)

HINDENBURG the man, Hindenburg the citizen, Hindenburg the soldier, appear and reappear with varying distinctness and impressiveness in these shifting scenes of an active and eventful life. It was a spring day in the year 1859 when the eleven-year-old youngster bade his father goodbye at the entrance to the Cadet School at Wahlstatt in Silesia, and brushing a tear from his new army coat, stepped alone through the iron gate into the fascinating and forbidding world of the profession of arms. Seven years of rather rough bodily training and systematic discipline, calculated to develop self-reliance and initiative as well as proper subordination, brought him to the first landmark in his career, his graduation on the eve of the war of 1866, and his appointment as a second lieutenant in the 3d Guard Infantry Regiment. As commander of a platoon, he did his part in the battle of Königgrätz, receiving a slight wound and his first decoration, the cross of the Red Eagle. A few years of garrison duty carried him to the opportunities and ordeals of the war of 1870.

With the pick of Prussia's military manhood, still armed with the comparatively short-range needle gun, he charged through the long-range fire of chassepots, across the slopes of St. Privat; stood in the iron ring that closed in on Napoleon III., and by his capture dealt the death-blow to his tottering empire, at Sedan; watched and waited in the throttling, battering girdle that brought Paris, and with it the Thiers republican régime, to submission.

Returning to Germany in 1871, he served with troops until 1873, when he entered the War Academy at Berlin as a student officer. In 1878, being about thirty-one years old, he was transferred as a captain from the line to the General Staff and assigned to the headquarters of the II. Army Corps. This was the beginning of his service as a general staff officer, which, with little interruption, was to continue through the rest of his career. From the headquarters of a corps he went, in

1881, to that of a division, and from there, in 1884, to a company as its commanding officer.

After a year of duty as company commander, he passed from the General Staff into the Great General Staff, and soon afterwards to the rank of major. He now collaborated in the preparation of the first Manual of Field Service Regulations, and in addition to this or other important work, discharged the duties of instructor of tactics at the War Academy. In 1889, he drew up instructions for engineer troops in the field and for the use of heavy field artillery in battle. From these desk duties he was glad to go, in 1893, to the command of an infantry regiment. From 1896 to 1900 he was chief of staff of the VIII. Army Corps, and on account of his long service in this position was excused from the usual tour of duty as brigade commander. From 1900 to 1903 he commanded the 28th Division, and from 1903 to 1911 the IV. Army Corps. With no war or advancement in sight, he applied in 1911 for retirement, and it was granted to him.

On August 22, 1914, Liège had fallen, and jubilations over German successes were spreading over Germany, but the Russians were penetrating East Prussia. Von Hindenburg was asked whether he was ready for immediate active service. He answered that he was, and consequently, at an age when an officer of the United States army is supposed to be fit only for sedentary duty, was placed in command of the VIII. Army, to which the Emperor and the country looked for deliverance and safety from the horrors of a Russian invasion. His career from now on is the story of the war on the eastern front, until August 29, 1916, when he became chief of staff of the army. After that it is the story of the war. It can be followed in the work of von Ludendorff, better than in the one before us. Von Ludendorff is fuller and more definite, and his maps are more numerous and helpful. Von Hindenburg, however, throws a new light on more than one interesting question. He lets us know (pp. 128, 129) that when, in the summer of 1915, von Ludendorff held to his plan of attack, in spite of the fact that von Falkenhayn, chief of staff of the army, had in the name of the Emperor prescribed a different one, von Hindenburg saw what his duty was in the matter; and he would have us believe that he did that duty. But on this point he fails to carry conviction. From the collective evidence of von Falkenhayn, von Ludendorff, and von Hindenburg, it appears that the plan prescribed by von Falkenhayn was not carried out, and that its failure was due to the withholding of forces for use in an attempt to execute the plan of von Ludendorff.

That von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff were later called to take the place of von Falkenhayn, goes to show how the German military machine had deteriorated since the days of old von Moltke and William I. In our comparatively rough-and-tumble struggle of "armed mobs", a Union general was court-martialled and disgraced on an ill-founded charge of a less serious infraction of discipline than that of which von Ludendorff was primarily guilty, and for which von Hindenburg was principally responsible.

When von Falkenhayn was relieved, the reasons for such action, says von Hindenburg, were not communicated to him by the Emperor (p. 148). It may be inferred that they were made known to him by some one else. However this may be, neither von Hindenburg nor von Falkenhayn has given them to the public. But the attendant circumstances and the subsequent course of operations on the western front make it apparent that the principal reason for the change was the Emperor's disagreement with von Falkenhayn over the general policy for the conduct of the war. Von Falkenhavn was for defensive action with a view to wearing the enemy out. The Emperor still believed, it seems, in the possibility of breaking through the allied lines. He therefore wanted a vigorous, smashing offensive, such as von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff had stood for on the eastern front. One attempt after another to give him such a success ended in failure, and in July, 1918, it became necessary to renounce all further attempts; to abandon the territory that had been gained, and surrender the initiative to the enemy; in other words, to fall back on the methods advocated by von Falkenhavn.

In this last stage of the war von Ludendorff issued a proclamation in opposition to the peace terms proposed by President Wilson. He believed, it seems, that it expressed the ideas of the German government. This paper was submitted to von Hindenburg for signature and was signed by him, without being first signed, as was usual in such a case, by von Ludendorff. After von Ludendorff had signed and issued it, he (von Ludendorff) learned that it did not agree with the views of the government. He promptly withdrew it, but it was too late. The mischief had been done.

Von Hindenburg makes no allusion to this document, but gives the text of a communication which he addressed on the same day, October 24, 1918, to the German Chancellor, calling for all possible reinforcement and moral support of the army (p. 396); in other words, for a levée en masse. It is only fair to assume that he had signed the von Ludendorff proclamation without knowing what he was doing. At any rate von Ludendorff, and not he, was held responsible for it. On October 26, the Emperor accepted the resignation of von Ludendorff and declined to accept that of von Hindenburg.

JOHN BIGELOW.

Deutschland und Amerika: Erinnerungen aus dem Fünfjährigen Kriege. Von Graf Johann Heinrich Bernstorff. (Berlin: Ullstein und Co. 1920. Pp. xii, 414.)

My Three Years in America. By Count Bernstorff. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1920. Pp. 428. \$5.00.)